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A Mixed-Method Review of Cash Transfers
and Intimate Partner Violence in low-
and Middle-Income Countries
Ana Maria Buller, Amber Peterman, Meghna Ranganathan, Alexandra Bleile,
Melissa Hidrobo, and Lori Heise
There is increasing evidence that cash transfer (CT) programs decrease intimate partner vi-
olence (IPV). However, little is known about how CTs achieve this impact. We conducted
a mixed-method review of studies in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Four-
teen quantitative and eight qualitative studies met our inclusion criteria, of which eleven
and five, respectively, demonstrated evidence that CTs decrease IPV. We found little sup-
port for increases in IPV, with only two studies showing overall mixed or adverse impacts.
Drawing on these studies, as well as related bodies of evidence, we developed a program
theory proposing three pathways through which CT could impact IPV: (a) economic se-
curity and emotional well-being, (b) intra-household conflict, and (c) women’s empower-
ment. The economic security and well-being pathway hypothesizes decreases in IPV, while
the other two pathways have ambiguous effects depending on program design features and
behavioral responses to program components. Future studies should improve IPV measure-
ment, empirical analysis of program mechanisms, and fill regional gaps. Program fram-
ing and complementary activities, including those with the ability to shift intra-household
power relations are likely to be important design features for understanding how tomaximize
and leverage the impact of CTs for reducing IPV, and mitigating potential adverse impacts.
Intimate partner violence. Domestic violence. Cash transfers. Women’s empowerment.
JEL codes: I10, I30, I38, J10, J12, J16.
There is increasing interest among social epidemiologists and development
economists in exploring the role that cash transfers (CTs) have on intimate part-
ner violence (IPV). Social epidemiologists have demonstrated the pervasiveness
of IPV globally, with one in three women estimated to experience at least one act
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of physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner in her lifetime (Devries
et al. 2013a). Development economists have invested heavily in rigorous large-scale
evaluations of social protection schemes, including CTs in low- and middle-income
countries (LMICs). As the body of research grows and sophistication of methodology
increases, there has been a push to demonstrate the impacts of CTs on a wider
range of outcomes beyond immediate program objectives related to poverty and food
security, including intra-household gender dynamics, and, more recently, women’s
experience of IPV. Thus, the fields of epidemiology and economics have converged
on the importance of understanding if CT and IPV are linked, and which behavioral
mechanisms may underpin this relationship.
Theoretically, the mechanisms through which CTs affect IPV depend on the de-
sign of the CT program. At their core, CTs are economic safety nets designed to re-
duce poverty. Absolute resource theory and stress theory hypothesize that CTs may
lead to decreases in IPV by improving a household’s economic situation, thereby
reducing poverty-related stressors on individuals and households (Fox et al. 2002;
Ellsberg et al. 2015; Vyas and Watts 2009). Additionally, many CT programs target
women as the main beneficiary, thus potentially affecting power dynamics within
the household. To model these power dynamics, economists use variants of non-
unitary household bargainingmodels in which an increase in awoman’s income (ei-
ther earned or unearned as with a CT), may decrease violence by improving her bar-
gaining power within the household (Tauchen, Witte, and Long 1991; Farmer and
Tiefenthaler 1997). However, variants of the bargaining model also predict that an
increase in women’s resources may put a woman at increased risk of IPV if men feel
threatened and use violence to reassert authority in the relationship (Eswaran and
Malhotra 2011). Additionally, cash and other transfers targeted at women may also
put them at risk if men use violence to extract cash or resources from them (Bloch
and Rao 2002).
Theories in other disciplines such as marital dependency and feminism likewise
offer mixed predictions of the effect of cash on a woman’s risk of experiencing IPV.
Womenwho are economically dependent on their partner and are surrounded by in-
stitutions that promote gender inequality and male authority over female behavior
may be more susceptible to violence (Vyas and Watts 2009). Thus, CTs that target
women may empower them both in the home and in the community, thereby reduc-
ing their risk of IPV. At the same time, if a woman’s partner feels emasculated in his
role as provider, or threatened by her increased independence, hemay redouble his ef-
forts to assert authority, using violence if necessary (Heise and GarciaMoreno 2002;
Hautzinger 2003). As Jewkes (2002) observes:
“An inability tomeet social expectations of successfulmanhood can trigger a crisis
of male identity. Violence againstwomen is ameans of resolving this crisis because
it allows expression of power that is otherwise denied.”
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Finally, many CT programs include complementary activities such as trainings
and/or linkages to health or educational services, either as a part of the program
or as a “conditionality” intended to influence beneficiary behaviour—components
which themselves could affect IPV. For example, group-based trainings attended by
women could reduce IPV by improving their knowledge, self-efficacy, and self-esteem,
thus enhancing their bargaining power. Frequent interactions with other beneficia-
ries in the community could build women’s social capital and social ties (Brody et
al. 2015), or increase the social cost of men’s violent behavior (Stets 1991; VanWyk
et al. 2003). Since variation in programdesign is large—including size, duration, and
targeting of transfers, and overlay of complementary activities—implementers’ rou-
tinelymake critical decisions that influence the program’s potential impact on diverse
beneficiary populations.
While testing and validating theoreticalmodels is needed to better understand and
predict the impact that cash may have on IPV, there are also pressing programmatic
and policy reasons to better understand these relationships and how they function
across contexts and populations. First, the scale and reach of CT programming glob-
ally is both large and increasing. According to the World Bank’s State of Social Safety
Nets (2015), 1.9 billion people worldwide are enrolled in some form of social safety
net, with approximately 20 programs operating in the average developing country
and CTs present in nearly every country. In addition, CTs are expanding rapidly. For
example, in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), about half of countries in the region (21) had
some form of unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programming in 2010—a number
that reached40by2014. Inaddition,CTs tend tobe cost-effective, both in comparison
with alternative in-kind transfers, as well as in comparison with alternative forms of
poverty-alleviation (Margolies andHoddinott 2014;Gentilini 2016). Because of their
scale (reaching 718million individuals globally) and relative cost-effectiveness, small
changes in how transfers are designed and delivered have the potential to influence
their impact on IPV at themargin (World Bank 2015). Similarly, given the possibility
of backlashand increases in IPV, it is essential that donors and implementingagencies
understand these risks andwork tominimize unintended harm from such programs.
Recent reviews have sought to summarize evidence on this topic; however, none
have been sufficient to understand the complex relationship between CTs and
women’s risk of IPV (Bardasi and Garcia 2014; Bastagli et al. 2016). Some focus
largely on quantitative evidence and group IPV outcomes alongside other gendered
outcomes such as women’s decision-making, agency, fertility, or earlymarriage, thus
providing little understanding of themechanisms underlying the cash/violence rela-
tionship in different contexts. Those that focus more narrowly on IPV as an outcome
combine cash transfers with a range of other economic strengthening interventions
from microfinance and savings schemes to the impact of women’s employment on
IPV, making it impossible to isolate the impact of cash alone (Krishnan et al. 2010;
Gibbs, Jacobson, and Kerr Wilson 2017).
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In order to fill this gap, we have conducted a mixed-method review to help inform
the understanding of the causal link between CTs and IPV in LMICs. First, we review
the existing body of rigorous quantitative and qualitative research linking CTs and
IPV, with a focus both on mechanisms underlying the results and the implications
of CT design features on the IPV outcome. Second, we build a program theory and
evaluate the level of evidence existing in support of the various pathways, drawing
on both the reviewed CT literature and evidence from other fields that support or re-
fute steps along the hypothesized causal pathway. Finally, we propose programdesign
components and factors that may be key in delivering beneficial impacts, identify re-
search gaps, and discuss how upcoming evaluations could be tailored or modified to
fill these gaps.
Methods
We conducted a scoping exercise, which comprised a rapid assessment of the known
literature, hand-searched articles, as well as articles obtained from general search
engines (Google scholar). Based on this initial rapid assessment, we conducted inter-
views via Skype with six experts (researchers and implementers) with prior experi-
ence on the intersection between CTs and IPV. These interviews helped identify key
literature, working papers, and ongoing studies, and pointed to mechanisms and hy-
potheses that leading experts considered viable as potential pathways linking CTs and
IPV.
For the formal review process, searches were conducted using the following broad
criteria: “cash transfers” and “violence”, “intimate partner violence” or “domestic vi-
olence”. Searches were conducted using the following electronic databases: PubMed,
Medline, Web of knowledge, Web of Science, Global Health, and Social Sciences Ab-
stracts. No search period restrictionwas imposed; however, we did limit our search to
documents written in English and Spanish. Articles published in peer-reviewed jour-
nals and relevant grey literature were included. We ran forward and backward cita-
tion checks among all identified articles that met the inclusion criteria.
Table 1 describes the broad inclusion and exclusion criteria for our review. We fo-
cused exclusively on LMICs and included all types of cash transfers, whether they are
conditional cash transfers (CCTs), UCTs, or bundled as part of multi-sectoral or com-
ponent programming, regardless of their objective (e.g., food security, entrepreneur-
ship, or old-age pensions). We excluded two cases of lump-sum CTs that were in-
cluded primarily as part of entrepreneurship and micro-credit programs (in Uganda
and Burkina Faso), as they were likely to vary substantially in the mechanisms and
impact pathways; however, we include these two cases as part of the discussion. We
focused on the outcomes of IPV (or domestic violence), which encompasses the fol-
lowing: physical, sexual, emotional, and/or psychological violence, including con-
trolling behaviors, typically experienced inside the household, regardless of the
4 TheWorld Bank Research Observer, vol. 0, no. 0 ( 2018)
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specificmethodology used to collect or measure each indicator. The IPV is further de-
fined as violence between intimate partners (e.g., marital, co-habiting or dating part-
ners), primarily experienced by women and perpetrated bymen. However, we did not
exclude evidence in the opposite direction. We included evidence showing impacts
on one or more combinations of IPV outcomes, including those that show different
impacts by violence type.We excluded studies that only used proxymeasures for IPV,
including general terms such as “conflict”, “disputes”, or measures of autonomy or
empowerment. For empirical studies, we focused on methodologies that allowed a
credible identification of the counterfactual, typically either randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) or quasi-experimental designswith data collection at two ormore points
in time. For qualitative studies, we used the consolidated criteria for reporting quali-
tative research (COREQ) checklist (Tong, Sainsbury, and Craig 2007).1 Two indepen-
dent researchers scored the articles using three domains—(a) research team and re-
flexivity, (b) study design andmethods, and (c) data analysis and reporting—to assign
a score of high, medium, or low quality. We did not exclude any studies according to
this assessment but report on the scores achieved by each study.
For both quantitative and qualitative studies, we first read the content to identify
themes and mechanisms. Thereafter, we developed a matrix summarizing key in-
formation regarding the program design, implementation, and features of interest.
For quantitative studies, we compiled information on methodological design, sample
sizes, indicators, and impacts. For qualitative studies, we summarized methods, sam-
ple sizes, and implied impact of CT and IPV (increase, decrease, mixed, or null im-
pacts).Where available, informationwas also extracted for both types of study on the
underlying mechanisms that authors advanced or tested as being possibly responsi-
ble for the impacts observed. Descriptions or mechanisms that relied on the interpre-
tation and opinion of the authors were treated as theoretical insights (hypotheses),
rather than evidence.
To further refine the program theory and assess different steps in the hypothesized
causal chain,we conducted comprehensive but non-exhaustive reviews of other bod-
ies of literature.We employed snowball sampling to identify additional studies for fur-
ther explanation-building, such as tracking citations in footnotes, endnotes, and ref-
erences of potentially relevant articles. The protocol was registered in the Prospero
database (CRD42015024511).
Results
Review of Programs and Quantitative Evidence
Table 2 summarizes the program components from the identified core quantitative
papers, organized alphabetically by country and by year of publication. For the quan-
titative evidence, we report impacts for all qualifying IPV indicators analyzed as part
6 TheWorld Bank Research Observer, vol. 0, no. 0 ( 2018)
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of the study. However, we do not present results for each sub-sample or heterogeneity
analysis. Instead, we summarize results of additional analysis in column 13 to help
unpack potential mechanisms.2
In total, we identified 14 studies meeting our inclusion criteria: six are peer-
reviewed journal articles, while eight are technical reports or working papers.3
In total, nine countries are represented, with multiple studies in Mexico, Ecuador,
and Peru. Only three studies were conducted in settings outside Latin America
(Bangladesh, Kenya, and South Africa), and in only one case (a World Food Pro-
gramme pilot in Ecuador targeted at Colombian refugees) could settings qualify as
humanitarian or post-conflict. Ten out of 14 studies evaluate government programs
(table 2, column3),whichhave been designed as CCTs typically conditional onhealth
and education co-responsibilities; three evaluate UCTs, with several providing addi-
tional services (e.g., behavior change communication; BCC) together with in-kind or
other transfers (e.g., food or food vouchers). Programs provide a mix of flat and vari-
able transfers (according to household size and demographic composition), ranging
from 6% to 50% of baseline household expenditures (table 2, column 5). The major-
ity of programs implement some type of means-based targeting to identify extremely
poor households as beneficiaries alongside demographic criteria such as the number
of children of specific ages residing in the household. Additionally, nearly all pro-
grams target women as the main recipient, with the exception of one program in
Kenya that randomizes targeting towomen ormen. Finally, themajority of programs
deliver benefits on a monthly basis (table 2, column 6).
Study designs are nearly all experimental (seven are either longitudinal or cross-
sectional RCTs) or quasi-experimental (five), with the remaining two using non-
experimental designs (table 2, column 7). Sample sizes at the individual level range
from 1,010 women (Kenya, Give Directly) to 8,065 women (Peru, Juntos). Addition-
ally, several evaluations used administrative data aggregated typically at the munic-
ipal level (in Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay). Data collection for studies ranges from
1998 to 2015, with most taking place from 2004 to 2012 (table 2, column 9). In
only one case did authors collect data post-intervention (e.g., 6 to 10 months after
program completion) to assess if impactswere sustained after the programhad ended
(Roy et al. 2017).
The 14 studies examine a range of IPV outcome indicators (table 2, column
10). Overall, 56 outcomes are analyzed, including 34 measures of physical or
sexual violence (13 physical violence, 10 sexual, four combined physical and/or
sexual, two combined physical and/or emotional violence, two combined physi-
cal/sexual/psychological and economic violence, two IPV reported to the health and
justice systems, and one administrative data on homicide). Additionally, 13 stud-
ies use measures of emotional violence, and 13 use other typologies (two control-
ling behaviors, three psychological violence, two economic violence, three threats of
physical IPV, two combinedmeasure of physical/sexual/psychological and economic
14 TheWorld Bank Research Observer, vol. 0, no. 0 ( 2018)
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violence, and one aggressive behavior).4 It should be noted that some experts con-
ceptualize controlling behaviors as a risk factor for IPV, rather than a type of violence
itself. The studies operationalize IPV in a variety of ways. Themajority use some form
of the conflict tactics scale (CTS), with recall periods typically six to 12months, while
a minority include lifetime measures (the latter may be less sensitive to a short-term
intervention). The exceptions are the three papers that used administrative data, as
well as one that asked about aggressive behavior following a partner’s consumption
of alcohol (Rivera, Hernández, and Castro 2005). For the mean and effect size, we
havemaintained the same number of significant digits or reporting as in the original
reviewed papers.
Across all 56 outcomes, 20 (36 percent) are statistically significant and negative
at the p < 0.10 level or higher (suggesting that the CT reduced IPV), while only one
(2 percent) is statistically significant and positive at the p< 0.10 level or higher (sug-
gesting that the CT increased IPV). The remaining 63 percent show no significant
change in IPV due to the CT. For significant reductions in IPV, the percentage varies
by category of violence examined: 44 percent of studies assessing physical and/or
sexual IPV and 38 percent assessing other outcomes (e.g., controlling behaviors)
demonstrate a significant reduction in violence, whereas only 8 percent of those as-
sessing emotional violence, do so. The one case where an increase is found in emo-
tional IPV is in the Give Directly pilot in Western Kenya when comparing treatment
to non-treatment households in the same villages (Haushofer and Shapiro 2016).
However, in the Kenya evaluation, reductions are also found for both physical and
sexual violence when comparing alternate study arms (e.g., what the authors term
the “across village”, rather than “within village” estimates). Although we do not for-
mally compute average effect sizes, when considering the 13 coefficients on indica-
tors of individual (rather than administrative) impacts, decreases range from 11 per-
cent to 66 percent reductions over baseline means (or endline comparison means).
Further, nine of these impacts represent reductions of 30 percent or more, which
is quite notable given that most evaluations took place over the short or medium
term.
When considering study-level impacts, overall, 11 out of the 14 studies find de-
creases in IPV attributable to the program, one finds mixed impacts (both decreases
and increases), and two find no impacts. The two studies finding no impact are both
from Mexico. One of the studies looks at long-term impacts of Oportunidades ap-
proximately nine to 13 years after program initiation empirically through the cre-
ation of comparable beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups using national surveys
(Bobonis, Castro, and Morales 2015). The authors hypothesize that this lack of im-
pact, which contrasts with the decreases they find in the short term, could be due
to marital dissolution and decreases in overall rates of IPV over time; however, they
are unable to test these theories comprehensively. The second study examines aggres-
sive behavior following alcohol consumption using data from the 1998 round of the
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experimentalOportunidades evaluation (Angelucci 2008).Althoughnoaverage effect
is found, there are treatment effects (both positive and negative) by certain household
characteristics and by transfer size—however, these are likely to be endogenous and
therefore it is unclear how these differential effects should be interpreted.
Authors have put forward various ideas about how CT programs could affect a
woman’s risk of violence, but few have tested their hypothesized mechanisms em-
pirically. Cash could decrease violence by: (a) Increasing women’s empowerment or
bargaining power, or changing intra-household gender dynamics (mentioned by all
12 studies documenting decreases, except Rivera, Hernández and Castro 2005; with
evidence from all but Rodriguez 2015 suggesting that the pathway could be valid).
(b) Decreasing household poverty and therefore poverty-related stress or improving
emotional well-being (mentioned by four studies: Rodriguez (2015); Hidrobo, Peter-
man, and Heise (2016); Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) Roy et al. (2017); with ev-
idence from all but Rodriguez (2015) suggesting that the pathway could be valid).
(c) Increasing interaction with the health sector, thereby improving women’s overall
health andmaking her more resilient to abuse (mentioned by one study, Ritter Burga
2014, including evidence suggesting the pathway could be valid). (d) Encouraging
greater interactionwith otherwomenandvillage leaders,which increases awoman’s
social capital and social ties, and could increase the social cost of men perpetrating
violence (mentioned by one study, however, not tested directly: Roy et al. 2017).
In only two cases do authors hypothesize reasons for potential increases in IPV, in-
cluding: (a) A partner seeking to extract resources/CT from his wife (mentioned by
one study: Bobonis, Gonzalez-Brenes, and Castro 2013, however not tested directly);
and (b) male backlash, specifically due to partners feeling threatened by women
usurping their traditional “identity” as a provider (Angelucci 2008; with evidence
suggesting the pathway could be valid).
Of note, only in one study (Hidrobo and Fernald 2013) do authors acknowledge
that theremay bemultiplemechanisms at play that could cancel each other out (e.g.,
female bargaining and male backlash).
Review of Programs and Qualitative Evidence
Table 3 summarizes the program components from the identified core qualitative
papers, organized alphabetically by country and author and year of publication.5
In total, we identified eight qualitative studies meeting our inclusion criteria: two
are published in peer-reviewed journals and seven are working papers or techni-
cal reports. In terms of quality assessment using the COREQ checklist (table 3, col-
umn 13), four of the included studies are given a high score and four are given
medium scores. Overall, the studies represent six countries, including two assessing
Oportunidades/Progresa in Mexico, one each from Ecuador and Nicaragua, two from
SSA (Uganda, and Lesotho), and one from Turkey (table 3, column 2). Three of the
16 TheWorld Bank Research Observer, vol. 0, no. 0 ( 2018)
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/w
bro/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/w
bro/lky002/5091868 by London School of H
ygiene & Tropical M
edicine user on 08 Septem
ber 2018
Ta
b
le
3
.R
ev
ie
w
of
C
or
e
Q
u
al
it
at
iv
e
Pa
pe
rs
w
it
h
Ev
id
en
ce
on
C
as
h
T
ra
n
sf
er
s
an
d
In
ti
m
at
e
Pa
rt
n
er
V
io
le
n
ce
.
P
ro
gr
am
de
ta
ils
Ev
al
u
at
io
n
ob
je
ct
iv
e
an
d
fin
di
n
gs
N
o.
A
u
th
or
s
C
ou
n
tr
y
P
ro
gr
am
M
od
al
it
y
T
ra
n
sf
er
am
ou
n
t
R
ec
ip
ie
n
ta
n
d
ta
rg
et
gr
ou
p
D
es
ig
n
an
d
sa
m
pl
e
si
ze
D
at
a
co
lle
ct
io
n
St
u
dy
ob
je
ct
iv
es
D
ir
ec
ti
on
of
ef
fe
ct
T
h
em
at
ic
re
su
lt
s
or
hy
po
th
es
iz
ed
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s
C
O
R
EQ
as
se
ss
m
en
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
1
B
u
lle
r
et
al
.
(2
0
1
6
)*
Ec
u
ad
or
W
or
ld
Fo
od
P
ro
gr
am
m
e
pi
lo
t
(U
n
it
ed
N
at
io
n
s)
C
as
h
,f
oo
d
or
vo
u
ch
er
+
nu
tr
it
io
n
tr
ai
n
in
gs
U
S$
4
0
/m
on
th
(e
qu
iv
al
en
ti
n
fo
od
or
vo
u
ch
er
s)
,∼
1
1
%
of
H
H
s
B
L
m
on
th
ly
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
W
om
en
(m
en
if
n
o
qu
al
ify
in
g
w
om
en
in
th
e
H
H
)a
cc
or
di
n
g
to
P
M
T
de
si
gn
ed
to
in
cl
u
de
C
ol
om
bi
an
re
fu
ge
es
in
7
u
rb
an
/p
er
i-
u
rb
an
ce
n
te
rs
4
8
ID
Is
an
d
2
FG
D
s
w
it
h
w
om
en
ra
n
do
m
ly
se
le
ct
ed
fr
om
qu
an
ti
ta
tiv
e
sa
m
pl
e
st
ra
ti
fie
d
on
ch
an
ge
s
in
IP
V
an
d
tr
an
sf
er
ar
m
;6
FG
D
s
w
it
h
m
en
ra
n
do
m
ly
se
le
ct
ed
fr
om
qu
an
ti
ta
tiv
e
sa
m
pl
e
st
ra
ti
fie
d
on
w
h
et
h
er
pa
rt
n
er
or
m
al
e
re
ce
iv
ed
tr
an
sf
er
2
0
1
3
1
)E
xp
lo
re
w
om
en
’s
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
s
of
tr
an
sf
er
s,
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
an
d
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
s
dy
n
am
ic
s
an
d
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
of
IP
V;
2
)
U
n
de
rs
ta
n
d
h
ow
tr
an
sf
er
s
m
ig
h
td
is
ru
pt
ge
n
de
r
re
la
ti
on
s
an
d
af
fe
ct
IP
V;
3
)E
xp
lo
re
h
ow
m
en
in
te
rp
re
te
d
an
d
re
ac
te
d
to
in
tr
od
u
ct
io
n
of
tr
an
sf
er
s
D
ec
re
as
ed
T
ra
n
sf
er
s
le
d
to
re
du
ct
io
n
s
in
IP
V
th
ro
u
gh
3
pa
th
w
ay
s:
1
)R
ed
u
ce
d
da
y
to
da
y
co
n
fli
ct
an
d
st
re
ss
in
th
e
co
u
pl
e
by
im
pr
ov
in
g
fin
an
ci
al
m
ea
n
s
to
fu
lfi
lb
as
ic
n
ee
ds
;2
)I
m
pr
ov
ed
H
H
w
el
l-
be
in
g
an
d
h
ap
pi
n
es
s;
3
)I
n
cr
ea
se
d
w
om
en
’s
de
ci
si
on
m
ak
in
g,
se
lf-
co
n
fid
en
ce
an
d
fr
ee
do
m
of
m
ov
em
en
t(
po
te
n
ti
al
ly
re
la
te
d
to
im
pr
ov
ed
fin
an
ci
al
si
tu
at
io
n
,
in
cr
ea
se
d
n
u
tr
it
io
n
al
kn
ow
le
dg
e,
an
d/
or
in
cr
ea
se
d
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
in
so
ci
al
gr
ou
ps
th
ro
u
gh
at
te
n
da
n
ce
at
n
u
tr
it
io
n
w
or
ks
h
op
s)
.
T
ra
n
sf
er
s
w
er
e
n
ot
pe
rc
ei
ve
d
as
th
re
at
en
in
g
to
m
en
be
ca
u
se
tr
ad
it
io
n
al
ge
n
de
r
n
or
m
s
di
ct
at
e
sh
op
pi
n
g
an
d
fo
od
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n
ar
e
w
it
h
in
th
e
“w
om
an
’s
do
m
ai
n
”.
H
ig
h
2
Sl
at
er
an
d
M
ph
al
e
(2
0
0
8
)†
Le
so
th
o
W
or
ld
V
is
io
n
pi
lo
t
(N
G
O
)
U
C
T
on
ly
,f
oo
d
on
ly
an
d
ca
sh
+
fo
od
to
H
H
s
M
8
0
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
(a
pp
ro
x.
U
S$
5
)c
as
h
;
fo
od
tr
an
sf
er
∼s
im
ila
r
va
lu
e,
de
pe
n
di
n
g
on
lo
ca
ti
on
D
ro
u
gh
t-
af
fe
ct
ed
h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
in
si
x
co
n
st
it
u
en
ci
es
in
tw
o
di
st
ri
ct
s
2
5
ID
Is
an
d
2
5
FG
D
s
w
it
h
be
n
efi
ci
ar
ie
s
an
d
n
on
-b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s.
FG
D
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
w
er
e
id
en
ti
fie
d
by
th
e
lo
ca
l
ch
ie
f
an
d
ID
I
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
fr
om
w
it
h
in
FG
D
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
2
0
0
7
-2
0
0
8
1
)W
h
at
im
pa
ct
h
as
th
e
re
ce
ip
to
f
fo
od
ai
d
or
ca
sh
h
ad
on
ge
n
de
r
re
la
ti
on
s
w
it
h
in
re
ci
pi
en
tH
H
s?
2
)
H
as
it
ea
se
d
co
n
fli
ct
ov
er
sc
ar
ce
re
so
u
rc
es
,o
r
cr
ea
te
d
co
n
fli
ct
ov
er
h
ow
to
u
se
or
sp
en
d
fo
od
ai
d
or
ca
sh
?
3
)H
ow
do
es
th
is
co
m
pa
re
to
H
H
s
in
si
m
ila
r
ec
on
om
ic
ci
rc
u
m
st
an
ce
s
w
h
o
h
av
e
n
ot
re
ce
iv
ed
fo
od
or
ca
sh
?
4
)H
ow
ar
e
de
ci
si
on
s
be
in
g
m
ad
e
ab
ou
th
ow
w
id
el
y
to
sh
ar
e
ca
sh
or
fo
od
w
it
h
in
an
d
be
tw
ee
n
H
H
s?
D
ec
re
as
ed
R
ed
u
ct
io
n
in
ge
n
de
r
co
n
fli
ct
s
an
d
te
n
si
on
s
(r
ec
on
fir
m
ed
w
it
h
au
th
or
th
at
th
e
u
se
of
th
e
ex
pr
es
si
on
‘c
on
fli
ct
’i
n
cl
u
de
d
IP
V
)f
ro
m
re
ce
iv
in
g
th
e
tr
an
sf
er
s.
T
h
is
is
be
ca
u
se
w
om
en
h
av
e
th
e
pr
im
ar
y
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y
fo
r
m
ee
ti
n
g
H
H
al
lo
ca
ti
on
an
d
bu
dg
et
in
g
n
ee
ds
.
Fu
rt
h
er
,s
in
ce
th
e
am
ou
n
to
f
ca
sh
w
as
su
ffi
ci
en
t,
bu
tn
ot
la
rg
e,
th
e
sc
op
e
of
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
de
ci
si
on
s
an
d
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
ts
w
as
re
la
tiv
el
y
lim
it
ed
.
Lo
w
Buller et al. 17
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/w
bro/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/w
bro/lky002/5091868 by London School of H
ygiene & Tropical M
edicine user on 08 Septem
ber 2018
Ta
b
le
3
.C
on
ti
n
u
ed
P
ro
gr
am
de
ta
ils
Ev
al
u
at
io
n
ob
je
ct
iv
e
an
d
fin
di
n
gs
N
o.
A
u
th
or
s
C
ou
n
tr
y
P
ro
gr
am
M
od
al
it
y
T
ra
n
sf
er
am
ou
n
t
R
ec
ip
ie
n
ta
n
d
ta
rg
et
gr
ou
p
D
es
ig
n
an
d
sa
m
pl
e
si
ze
D
at
a
co
lle
ct
io
n
St
u
dy
ob
je
ct
iv
es
D
ir
ec
ti
on
of
ef
fe
ct
T
h
em
at
ic
re
su
lt
s
or
hy
po
th
es
iz
ed
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s
C
O
R
EQ
as
se
ss
m
en
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
3
M
al
do
n
ad
o,
N
áj
er
a
an
d
Se
go
vi
a
(2
0
0
5
)†
M
ex
ic
o
O
po
rt
u
n
id
ad
es
(G
ov
t)
C
C
T
(s
ch
oo
l
at
te
n
da
n
ce
,h
ea
lt
h
ch
ec
ku
ps
an
d
tr
ai
n
in
gs
)
Ed
u
ca
ti
on
su
bs
id
y:
7
0
–6
2
5
pe
so
s
(U
S$
6
2
.5
)/
m
on
th
pe
r
H
H
(i
n
1
9
9
8
)H
ea
lt
h
su
bs
id
y:
1
2
pe
so
s/
m
on
th
an
d
nu
tr
it
io
n
al
su
pp
le
m
en
ts
fo
r
ch
ild
re
n
4
–2
4
m
on
th
s,
pr
eg
n
an
ta
n
d
br
ea
st
fe
ed
in
g
w
om
en
.
B
as
ic
in
co
m
e
su
pp
or
t:
1
0
0
pe
so
s/
m
on
th
pe
r
H
H
w
it
h
to
ta
lt
ra
n
sf
er
∼1
0
%
av
er
ag
e
H
H
ex
p
W
om
en
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
a
lo
ca
l-
le
ve
lm
ar
gi
n
al
it
y
in
de
x
(c
om
m
u
n
it
y
se
le
ct
io
n
)a
n
d
po
ve
rt
y-
ba
se
d
P
M
T
(H
H
se
le
ct
io
n
)
3
FG
D
s,
re
fe
rr
ed
to
as
re
fle
xi
ve
fo
cu
s
gr
ou
ps
(s
em
i-
st
ru
ct
u
re
d)
,
∼1
0
m
en
pe
r
gr
ou
p
(n
=
2
9
)
Se
pt
-O
ct
2
0
0
5
Ex
pl
or
es
th
e
ef
fe
ct
of
th
e
in
tr
od
u
ct
io
n
of
re
so
u
rc
es
on
co
u
pl
e
an
d
fa
m
ily
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
s
an
d
if
th
er
e
is
ch
an
ge
in
th
es
e
re
la
ti
on
s.
If
th
er
e
is
ch
an
ge
,t
h
en
w
h
at
is
th
e
ty
pe
an
d
sc
op
e
of
ch
an
ge
?
N
o
cl
ea
r
ef
fe
ct
N
o
di
re
ct
ef
fe
ct
of
ca
sh
on
in
cr
ea
se
in
IP
V;
m
on
ey
fr
om
th
e
pr
og
ra
m
w
as
ke
pt
as
id
e
as
m
on
ey
fo
r
th
e
H
H
(f
or
ch
ild
re
n
’s
ed
u
ca
ti
on
)
an
d
n
ot
as
m
on
ey
fo
r
th
e
w
om
an
(a
lt
h
ou
gh
sh
e
ad
m
in
is
te
re
d
it
).
H
en
ce
,m
en
di
d
n
ot
fe
el
th
re
at
en
ed
,a
n
d
th
er
e
w
as
n
o
in
cr
ea
se
in
IP
V.
If
IP
V
di
d
oc
cu
r,
it
w
as
re
la
te
d
m
or
e
to
th
e
dy
n
am
ic
s
of
th
e
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
an
d
th
e
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
of
po
w
er
w
it
h
in
th
e
co
u
pl
e
pr
io
r
to
th
e
re
ce
ip
to
f
tr
an
sf
er
s.
In
pa
rt
ic
u
la
r,
it
re
su
lt
ed
fr
om
si
tu
at
io
n
s
w
h
er
e
vi
ol
en
ce
w
as
se
en
as
n
or
m
al
by
m
en
.T
h
e
au
th
or
s
hy
po
th
es
iz
e
IP
V
m
ig
h
td
ec
re
as
e
as
a
pr
od
u
ct
of
le
ss
te
n
si
on
in
th
e
H
H
du
e
to
le
ss
m
on
ey
pr
ob
le
m
s,
h
ow
ev
er
,m
or
e
re
se
ar
ch
n
ee
ds
to
be
do
n
e
to
es
ta
bl
is
h
th
is
di
re
ct
lin
k.
M
ed
iu
m
4
A
da
to
et
al
.
(2
0
0
0
)†
M
ex
ic
o
O
po
rt
u
n
id
ad
es
(G
ov
t)
C
C
T
(o
n
sc
h
oo
l
at
te
n
da
n
ce
,h
ea
lt
h
ch
ec
ku
ps
an
d
tr
ai
n
in
gs
)
Sa
m
e
as
ab
ov
e
(M
al
do
n
ad
o,
N
áj
er
a
an
d
Se
go
vi
a
2
0
0
5
)
Sa
m
e
as
ab
ov
e
(M
al
do
n
ad
o,
N
áj
er
a
an
d
Se
go
vi
a
2
0
0
5
)
2
3
FG
D
S
in
6
st
at
es
(8
co
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s)
,w
it
h
2
3
0
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
:8
0
be
n
efi
ci
ar
ie
s,
8
0
n
on
-b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s
an
d
P
ro
m
ot
or
as
(c
om
m
u
n
it
y
w
or
ke
rs
)
re
pr
es
en
ti
n
g
7
0
co
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s
fr
om
7
re
gi
on
s
1
9
9
9
Ex
pl
or
es
pe
rc
ep
ti
on
s
of
w
om
en
as
pr
im
ar
y
re
ci
pi
en
ts
of
tr
an
sf
er
s,
w
om
en
an
d
m
en
’s
at
ti
tu
de
s
to
w
ar
d
th
is
as
pe
ct
of
pr
og
ra
m
de
si
gn
,a
n
d
th
e
po
si
tiv
e
an
d
n
eg
at
iv
e
ef
fe
ct
s
of
th
is
ch
oi
ce
.
N
o
cl
ea
r
ef
fe
ct
IP
V
do
es
n
ot
se
em
to
h
av
e
be
en
re
po
rt
ed
or
fr
ee
ly
di
sc
u
ss
ed
.Q
u
al
it
at
iv
el
y,
th
er
e
ap
pe
ar
s
to
be
n
o
ev
id
en
ce
th
at
th
e
re
ce
ip
to
f
ca
sh
in
cr
ea
se
d
IP
V,
bu
ti
f
H
H
s
al
re
ad
y
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
d
di
sh
ar
m
on
y,
th
en
pr
og
ra
m
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
m
ig
h
th
av
e
ex
ac
er
ba
te
d
it
.
Fu
rt
h
er
,I
P
V
w
as
di
sc
u
ss
ed
m
or
e
ge
n
er
al
ly
;
w
om
en
w
ou
ld
n
ot
sa
y
th
at
th
ey
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
d
it
th
em
se
lv
es
,b
u
tr
at
h
er
th
at
th
ey
kn
ew
of
su
ch
a
ca
se
in
th
ei
r
co
m
m
u
n
it
y.
IP
V
st
or
ie
s
w
er
e
ra
re
,e
it
h
er
be
ca
u
se
w
om
en
w
er
e
u
n
co
m
fo
rt
ab
le
ta
lk
in
g
ab
ou
ti
to
r
be
tt
er
re
se
ar
ch
m
et
h
od
s
ar
e
n
ee
de
d
to
co
lle
ct
it
.
H
ig
h
5
A
da
to
et
al
.
(2
0
0
4
)†
N
ic
ar
ag
u
a
R
ed
de
la
P
ro
te
cc
io
n
So
ci
al
(G
ov
t)
C
C
T
(o
n
sc
h
oo
l
at
te
n
da
n
ce
,h
ea
lt
h
ed
u
ca
ti
on
w
or
ks
h
op
s,
ch
ild
im
m
u
n
iz
at
io
n
s)
A
bo
u
tU
S$
3
0
/m
on
th
,
or
m
or
e
de
pe
n
di
n
g
on
nu
m
be
r
of
sc
h
oo
l-
ag
ed
ch
ild
re
n
W
om
en
(u
n
le
ss
si
n
gl
e
fa
th
er
s)
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
a
st
ra
ti
fie
d
ra
n
do
m
sa
m
pl
e
at
th
e
lo
ca
lit
y
le
ve
l,
Se
le
ct
io
n
of
lo
ca
lit
ie
s
u
si
n
g
po
ve
rt
y
in
de
x
SS
Is
,c
as
e
st
u
di
es
an
d
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
t
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
am
on
g
2
0
H
H
s
in
ea
ch
of
si
x
co
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s
se
le
ct
ed
on
ba
si
s
of
so
ci
al
st
ra
ti
fic
at
io
n
to
re
pr
es
en
t
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
n
of
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
A
u
g-
D
ec
2
0
0
3
Ex
pl
or
e
th
e
ef
fe
ct
of
th
e
pr
og
ra
m
on
in
di
vi
du
al
s
an
d
co
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s,
an
d
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s
fo
r
th
es
e
ef
fe
ct
s.
D
ec
re
as
ed
Fe
w
re
fe
re
n
ce
s
w
er
e
m
ad
e
by
w
om
en
re
ga
rd
in
g
m
en
’s
n
eg
at
iv
e
at
ti
tu
de
s
to
w
ar
ds
w
om
en
th
at
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
ed
in
th
e
pr
og
ra
m
.I
n
ge
n
er
al
,t
h
er
e
w
as
an
im
pr
ov
em
en
ti
n
H
H
re
la
ti
on
s
w
it
h
an
in
cr
ea
se
in
re
so
u
rc
es
du
e
to
re
du
ce
d
fin
an
ci
al
st
ra
in
.M
os
tw
om
en
m
en
ti
on
ed
th
at
m
en
ex
pr
es
se
d
ag
re
em
en
t
w
it
h
th
e
pr
og
ra
m
se
le
ct
in
g
w
om
en
as
re
ci
pi
en
ts
,a
s
th
ey
w
er
e
m
or
e
lik
e
to
sp
en
d
re
so
u
rc
es
on
th
e
fa
m
ily
.T
h
er
e
w
er
e
fe
w
in
st
an
ce
s
w
h
er
e
w
om
en
h
an
de
d
ov
er
th
ei
r
m
on
ey
to
m
en
or
th
at
th
e
be
n
efi
ci
ar
y
w
as
th
e
m
an
.R
ar
e
in
st
an
ce
s
of
m
en
fo
rc
ib
ly
ta
ki
n
g
m
on
ey
fr
om
w
iv
es
.
H
ig
h
18 TheWorld Bank Research Observer, vol. 0, no. 0 ( 2018)
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/w
bro/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/w
bro/lky002/5091868 by London School of H
ygiene & Tropical M
edicine user on 08 Septem
ber 2018
Ta
b
le
3
.C
on
ti
n
u
ed
P
ro
gr
am
de
ta
ils
Ev
al
u
at
io
n
ob
je
ct
iv
e
an
d
fin
di
n
gs
N
o.
A
u
th
or
s
C
ou
n
tr
y
P
ro
gr
am
M
od
al
it
y
T
ra
n
sf
er
am
ou
n
t
R
ec
ip
ie
n
ta
n
d
ta
rg
et
gr
ou
p
D
es
ig
n
an
d
sa
m
pl
e
si
ze
D
at
a
co
lle
ct
io
n
St
u
dy
ob
je
ct
iv
es
D
ir
ec
ti
on
of
ef
fe
ct
T
h
em
at
ic
re
su
lt
s
or
hy
po
th
es
iz
ed
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s
C
O
R
EQ
as
se
ss
m
en
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
6
Y
ild
ir
im
,O
zd
em
ir
an
d
Se
zg
in
(2
0
1
4
)*
Tu
rk
ey
So
ci
al
R
is
k
M
it
ig
at
io
n
P
ro
je
ct
of
th
e
G
en
er
al
D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
of
So
ci
al
A
ss
is
ta
n
ce
fin
an
ci
al
ly
su
pp
or
te
d
by
th
e
W
or
ld
B
an
k
(G
ov
t)
C
C
T
an
d
in
-k
in
d
(s
ch
oo
la
tt
en
da
n
ce
,
h
ea
lt
h
ch
ec
ku
ps
an
d
va
cc
in
es
an
d
in
-h
os
pi
ta
ld
el
iv
er
ie
s)
P
ri
m
ar
y
sc
h
oo
lb
oy
s
U
S$
1
5
,g
ir
ls
U
S$
2
0
;
se
co
n
da
ry
sc
h
oo
lb
oy
s
U
S$
2
5
,g
ir
ls
U
S$
3
0
;
h
ea
lt
h
su
pp
or
t
U
S$
1
5
/m
on
th
fo
r
ch
ild
re
n
0
–6
ye
ar
s;
h
ea
lt
h
su
pp
or
tf
or
pr
eg
n
an
tw
om
en
C
h
ild
re
n
(b
oy
s
an
d
gi
rl
s)
of
ta
rg
et
ed
gr
ou
p
re
ce
iv
e
ed
u
ca
ti
on
al
tr
an
sf
er
s
ba
se
d
on
sc
h
oo
l
at
te
n
da
n
ce
(a
lt
h
ou
gh
tr
an
sf
er
s
ar
e
h
ig
h
er
fo
r
gi
rl
s
to
en
co
u
ra
ge
fe
m
al
e
ed
u
ca
ti
on
)a
n
d
h
ea
lt
h
tr
an
sf
er
s
co
n
di
ti
on
al
on
re
gu
la
r
h
ea
lt
h
ce
n
te
r
vi
si
ts
an
d
va
cc
in
at
io
n
s
3
9
7
ID
Is
w
it
h
be
n
efi
ci
ar
ie
s
an
d
ke
y
in
fo
rm
an
ts
2
0
1
1
Ex
pl
or
es
th
e
vi
ew
s,
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
s,
an
d
pe
rc
ep
ti
on
s
of
C
T
pr
og
ra
m
be
n
efi
ci
ar
ie
s.
D
ec
re
as
ed
W
h
en
be
n
efi
ci
ar
ie
s
w
er
e
as
ke
d
if
th
ey
h
ad
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
d
IP
V
in
H
H
s
be
fo
re
re
ce
ip
to
f
C
C
Ts
an
d
w
h
et
h
er
th
er
e
h
ad
be
en
a
de
cr
ea
se
af
te
r
re
ce
ip
t,
8
%
re
po
rt
ed
n
o
IP
V
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
d
in
th
e
H
H
.A
m
aj
or
it
y
of
fig
h
ts
an
d
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
IP
V
ap
pe
ar
ed
to
be
du
e
to
fin
an
ci
al
di
ffi
cu
lt
ie
s.
A
lm
os
t7
1
%
of
vi
ct
im
s
of
IP
V
su
gg
es
te
d
th
at
it
w
as
de
cr
ea
se
d
af
te
r
th
ey
re
ce
iv
ed
st
ip
en
ds
.
H
ig
h
7
A
n
ge
le
s
(2
0
1
2
)†
U
ga
n
da
A
ct
io
n
ag
ai
n
st
H
u
n
ge
r
(N
G
O
)
U
C
T
(b
u
ta
ls
o
in
cl
u
de
d
is
th
e
fo
rm
of
V
LS
A
gr
ou
ps
,
liv
el
ih
oo
ds
tr
ai
n
in
g
an
d
G
B
V
pr
ev
en
ti
on
ac
tiv
it
ie
s)
U
S$
1
7
0
in
2
in
st
al
lm
en
ts
Vu
ln
er
ab
le
w
om
en
in
ta
rg
et
ed
ar
ea
s
in
th
e
n
or
th
1
0
FG
D
s
w
it
h
pr
im
ar
y
be
n
efi
ci
ar
ie
s
an
d
1
6
ID
Is
am
on
g
be
n
efi
ci
ar
ie
s
an
d
st
af
f
2
0
1
1
Ex
pl
or
es
h
ow
th
e
C
T
in
te
rv
en
ti
on
re
du
ce
d
G
B
V
an
d
h
ow
th
e
pr
og
ra
m
w
or
ke
d.
D
ec
re
as
ed
A
cc
or
di
n
g
to
w
om
en
,t
ra
n
sf
er
s
h
el
pe
d
re
du
ce
d
fin
an
ci
al
st
re
ss
.T
h
er
e
w
as
a
de
cr
ea
se
in
fig
h
ts
th
at
oc
cu
rr
ed
w
it
h
in
co
u
pl
es
as
th
ey
co
u
ld
av
oi
d
fig
h
ti
n
g
ov
er
sc
ar
ce
re
so
u
rc
es
an
d
co
m
pe
ti
n
g
ov
er
m
ea
gr
e
re
so
u
rc
es
.T
h
e
C
T
h
el
pe
d
pa
y
fo
r
a
n
u
m
be
r
of
it
em
s
su
ch
as
sc
h
oo
lf
ee
s,
m
ed
ic
al
bi
lls
or
im
m
ed
ia
te
n
ee
ds
.
Lo
w
So
m
e
w
om
en
al
so
fe
lt
th
at
tr
an
sf
er
s
in
cr
ea
se
d
w
om
en
’s
fin
an
ci
al
au
to
n
om
y.
T
h
ey
w
er
e
le
ss
de
pe
n
de
n
to
n
th
ei
r
h
u
sb
an
ds
th
an
be
fo
re
on
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
s
re
la
te
d
to
th
ei
r
pe
rs
on
al
n
ee
ds
.I
f
th
er
e
w
as
n
ot
en
ou
gh
m
on
ey
to
go
ar
ou
n
d,
fig
h
ti
n
g
en
su
ed
.
W
om
en
re
po
rt
ed
th
at
‘fi
gh
ti
n
g’
m
ea
n
tv
er
ba
l
or
ph
ys
ic
al
vi
ol
en
ce
.
Buller et al. 19
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/w
bro/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/w
bro/lky002/5091868 by London School of H
ygiene & Tropical M
edicine user on 08 Septem
ber 2018
Ta
b
le
3
.C
on
ti
n
u
ed
P
ro
gr
am
de
ta
ils
Ev
al
u
at
io
n
ob
je
ct
iv
e
an
d
fin
di
n
gs
N
o.
A
u
th
or
s
C
ou
n
tr
y
P
ro
gr
am
M
od
al
it
y
T
ra
n
sf
er
am
ou
n
t
R
ec
ip
ie
n
ta
n
d
ta
rg
et
gr
ou
p
D
es
ig
n
an
d
sa
m
pl
e
si
ze
D
at
a
co
lle
ct
io
n
St
u
dy
ob
je
ct
iv
es
D
ir
ec
ti
on
of
ef
fe
ct
T
h
em
at
ic
re
su
lt
s
or
hy
po
th
es
iz
ed
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s
C
O
R
EQ
as
se
ss
m
en
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
8
N
u
w
ak
or
a
(2
0
1
4
)†
U
ga
n
da
A
ct
io
n
ag
ai
n
st
H
u
n
ge
r
(N
G
O
)
U
C
T
(b
u
ta
ls
o
in
cl
u
de
d
is
th
e
fo
rm
of
V
LS
A
gr
ou
ps
,
liv
el
ih
oo
ds
tr
ai
n
in
g
an
d
G
B
V
pr
ev
en
ti
on
ac
tiv
it
ie
s)
Sa
m
e
as
ab
ov
e
(A
n
ge
le
s
2
0
1
2
)
Vu
ln
er
ab
le
w
om
en
in
ta
rg
et
ed
ar
ea
s
in
th
e
n
or
th
1
2
FG
D
s,
1
9
ID
Is
an
d
co
n
su
lt
at
iv
e
m
ee
ti
n
gs
w
it
h
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
.
2
0
1
4
Ex
pl
or
es
h
ow
th
e
C
T
in
te
rv
en
ti
on
re
du
ce
d
G
B
V
an
d
h
ow
th
e
pr
og
ra
m
w
or
ke
d.
M
ix
ed
ev
id
en
ce
,i
n
m
os
tc
as
es
de
cr
ea
se
d
an
d
in
cr
ea
se
in
so
m
e
is
ol
at
ed
ca
se
s.
T
h
e
C
Ts
re
su
lt
ed
in
:1
)O
ve
ra
ll
re
du
ct
io
n
s
in
ph
ys
ic
al
,s
ex
u
al
an
d
em
ot
io
n
al
vi
ol
en
ce
;f
or
th
e
m
al
e
m
em
be
rs
of
be
n
efi
ci
ar
y
h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
,t
h
e
C
T
pr
es
en
te
d
a
do
u
bl
e-
ed
ge
d
sw
or
d.
O
n
th
e
on
e
h
an
d,
it
im
pr
ov
ed
th
e
fin
an
ci
al
co
n
di
ti
on
s
of
th
e
H
H
w
h
ils
t
re
lie
vi
n
g
th
em
of
th
e
bu
rd
en
of
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y.
H
en
ce
in
so
m
e
ca
se
s,
m
en
fe
lt
it
co
n
tr
ib
u
te
d
to
or
n
or
m
al
iz
ed
n
eg
at
iv
e
m
as
cu
lin
it
ie
s;
an
d
2
)R
ed
u
ct
io
n
s
in
le
ve
ls
of
al
co
h
ol
is
m
am
on
g
m
en
.H
ow
ev
er
in
so
m
e
is
ol
at
ed
ca
se
s,
th
er
e
w
as
an
in
cr
ea
se
in
IP
V.
So
m
e
w
om
en
re
po
rt
ed
m
en
w
an
ti
n
g
th
e
m
on
ey
to
dr
in
k
al
co
h
ol
re
su
lt
in
g
in
th
e
w
om
an
ge
tt
in
g
be
at
en
.A
ls
o
so
m
e
m
en
vi
ew
ed
w
om
en
as
ov
er
-e
m
po
w
er
ed
an
d
th
u
s
m
en
pe
rc
ei
ve
d
w
om
en
as
“t
h
re
at
s”
.
M
ed
iu
m
So
ur
ce
:T
h
e
au
th
or
s
N
ot
es
:A
st
er
is
k
*r
ef
er
st
o
pe
er
-r
ev
ie
w
ed
jo
u
rn
al
ar
ti
cl
e;
†
re
fe
rs
to
w
or
ki
n
g
pa
pe
ro
rt
ec
h
n
ic
al
re
po
rt
;(
a)
D
ir
ec
ti
on
of
ef
fe
ct
de
m
on
st
ra
te
sw
h
et
h
er
th
e
C
T
in
cr
ea
se
d,
de
cr
ea
se
d,
h
ad
m
ix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
or
h
ad
n
o
ef
fe
ct
on
IP
V;
(b
)T
h
e
C
O
R
EQ
as
se
ss
m
en
ti
s
a
3
2
-i
te
m
ch
ec
kl
is
tt
o
h
el
p
re
se
ar
ch
er
s
re
po
rt
im
po
rt
an
ta
sp
ec
ts
of
qu
al
it
at
iv
e
re
se
ar
ch
,s
u
ch
as
th
e
re
se
ar
ch
te
am
an
d
re
fle
xi
vi
ty
,s
tu
dy
de
si
gn
an
d
m
et
h
od
s,
da
ta
an
al
ys
is
an
d
re
po
rt
in
g.
Sc
or
in
g
ba
se
d
on
as
se
ss
m
en
tb
y
tw
o
in
de
pe
n
de
n
tr
es
ea
rc
h
er
s;
(c
)O
u
tc
om
es
in
cl
u
de
d
br
oa
de
r
fo
rm
s
of
G
B
V
(e
.g
.,
se
xu
al
vi
ol
en
ce
,t
h
ef
t)
.
A
bb
re
vi
at
io
ns
:B
L
=
ba
se
lin
e;
C
T
=
ca
sh
tr
an
sf
er
;C
C
T
=
co
n
di
ti
on
al
ca
sh
tr
an
sf
er
;F
G
D
=
fo
cu
s
gr
ou
p
di
sc
u
ss
io
n
s;
G
B
V
=
ge
n
de
r-
ba
se
d
vi
ol
en
ce
;G
ov
t
=
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t;
H
H
=
h
ou
se
h
ol
d;
ID
I
=
in
-d
ep
th
in
te
rv
ie
w
;
IP
V
=
in
ti
m
at
e
pa
rt
n
er
vi
ol
en
ce
;
M
=
Le
so
th
o
M
al
ot
i;
N
G
O
=
n
on
-g
ov
er
n
m
en
ta
l
or
ga
n
is
at
io
n
;
P
M
T
=
pr
ox
y
m
ea
n
s
te
st
;
SS
I=
se
m
i-
st
ru
ct
u
re
d
in
te
rv
ie
w
;U
C
T
=
u
n
co
n
di
ti
on
al
ca
sh
tr
an
sf
er
;U
S$
=
U
n
it
ed
St
at
es
do
lla
r;
V
LS
A
=
vi
lla
ge
lo
an
s
sa
vi
n
gs
as
so
ci
at
io
n
.
20 TheWorld Bank Research Observer, vol. 0, no. 0 ( 2018)
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/w
bro/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/w
bro/lky002/5091868 by London School of H
ygiene & Tropical M
edicine user on 08 Septem
ber 2018
qualitative studies are NGO-led programs, of which two are external evaluations of
the same CT implemented by Action Against Hunger in northern Uganda in 2012
and 2014; three are government-run programs (twoUCTs and one CCT); and two are
run by international organizations (table 3, column 3). Of the eight qualitative stud-
ies, three interventions are UCTs: one provides cash, food, or vouchers conditional on
attending nutrition training, while four are CCTs (table 3, column4).Women are tar-
geted as themain recipient inmost programs, despite cases where the household or a
small proportion of males receive the transfer (Lesotho and Ecuador; table 3, column
6). In almost all the studies, either focus group discussions (two studies), in-depth in-
terviews (two studies) or a combination of the two methods (four studies) were used
as the method of data collection. One study in Nicaragua used an ethnographic ap-
proach, with semi-structured interviews and participant observation to explore per-
ceptions of the program (table 3, column7). Data collection for the studies range from
1999 to 2014, with the majority taking place between 2011 and 2014 (table 3, col-
umn 8).
The eight qualitative studies explore a range of dynamics relevant to CTs and IPV,
including the following: addressing how the receipt of cash has influenced household
gender relations; whether conflict over resources within the household has increased
or decreased; whether there has been a change in couple and/or family relationships;
and whether receipt of the transfer has affected women’s decision-making author-
ity. Some studies focus specifically on these themes, while others are more general,
exploring the impact of CT on poverty alleviation with sub-objectives that focus on
gender relations and household decision-making (table 3, column 10). Five of the
studies show a reduction in IPV after receipt of the CT (Adato et al. 2004; Slater
and Mphale 2008; Angeles 2012; Yildirim, Ozdemir, and Sezgin 2014; Buller et al.
2016;), while one study shows mixed results with an overall reduction in all forms
of IPV but also some isolated households where IPV increased (Nuwakora 2014).
Two studies show no clear effect of the CT on IPV (Adato et al. 2000; Maldonado,
Nájera, and Segovia 2005). In one of these studies the authors note that IPVwas not
reported freely given the sensitivenature of the topic,whichmighthave influenced re-
sults (Adato et al. 2000). In the other studywith no clear effects, Maldonado, Nájera,
and Segovia (2005), who explore the impact of Oportunidades on intra-household dy-
namics in Mexico, hypothesize that the dedicated use of the transfer for children’s
education—as opposed to money for a woman herself—has meant that men have
not felt threatened by the transfer, resulting in null effects on IPV.
Authors of these qualitative studies suggest that the following mechanisms could
explain decreases in IPV: (a) Reductions in poverty-related stress (mentioned by five
studies: Adato et al. (2004); Angeles (2012); Yildirim, Ozdemir, and Sezgin (2014);
Nuwakora (2014); Buller et al. (2016), with evidence by all suggesting that the path-
way could be valid). (b) Reduction in household tensions leading to fewer conflicts
(mentioned by four studies: Slater and Mphale (2008); Angeles (2012); Yildirim,
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Ozdemir, and Sezgin (2014); Buller et al. (2016); with evidence by all suggesting
that the pathway could be valid). (c) Increased women’s decision-making power in
the household and feelings of empowerment (mentioned by four studies: Slater and
Mphale (2008); Angeles (2012); Nuwakora (2014); Buller et al. (2016), with evi-
dence by all suggesting that the pathway could be valid).
In the few studies that mention increases in IPV, authors suggest the follow-
ing mechanisms could increase IPV: (a) The forced extraction of money/cash by
a woman’s male partner (mentioned by two studies: Nuwakora (2014) and Adato
et al. (2000), with evidence from Nuwakora (2014) only suggesting that the path-
way could be valid). (b) As a compensatory mechanism to re-assert authority when
a man feels his masculinity is being threatened (mentioned by one study: Nuwakora
(2014), with evidence suggesting that the pathway could be valid).
Program Theory for Understanding the Relationship between CTs
and IPV
Our review suggests that there are three primary pathways through which CTs may
affect IPV. For ease of reference, we have named these: (a) the economic security
and emotional well-being pathway; (b) the intra-household conflict pathway; and (c)
the women’s empowerment pathway. The first pathway operates primarily through
household-level mechanisms, evolving from a pure “income effect” of cash into the
household (regardless of who is the primary recipient),which reduces poverty-related
stress and improves emotional well-being. The second pathwayworks through the ef-
fect of cash on marital dynamics and conflict: increased access to cash, particularly
in very poor households, can lessen conflict by reducing arguments over limited bud-
gets and dailymoney needed to run the household. Alternatively, if CT funds are used
for expenditures not intended to benefit all household members, for example to pur-
chase alcohol or tobacco, cash could create new sources of marital conflict. Finally,
through the third pathway, cash or complementary interventions could, if appropri-
ately targeted, increase a woman’s bargaining power, strengthen her self-worth, and
potentially increase her perceived value to the household. Similar to the conflict path-
way, this may have mixed effects depending on how men respond to potential shifts
in resources or power dynamics. On the one hand, some men may feel threatened in
situations where their wives are empowered, which can lead to a backlash and in-
creased IPV as men attempt to reassert control and their identity as the household
provider or dominant decision-maker. On the other hand, somemenmay accept this
elevated position of women in the household and decrease IPV in order to keep her
satisfied within the marriage.
Figure 1 summarises the three pathways and articulates the various steps in the
hypothesized causal chain. Design elements listed on the far left—such as the size,
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Figure 1. Program Theory Linking Cash Transfer and Intimate Partner Violence
Source: The authors.
Note: IPV= Intimate partner violence.
frequency and duration of transfers, and targeting criteria including the particular
vulnerability and poverty profiles of the beneficiary population and whether or not
women are explicit recipients—can influence the impact of a program. We hypoth-
esize that the specific pathways or causal mechanisms that operate in any instance
may be a function of: (a) the design features of the CT itself; (b) how a woman’s part-
ner reacts to the transfer; and (c) the context of theCTprogram, includingunderlying
factors such as the gender regimes, social norms, and local laws and policies. In the
following sections, we explain stylized versions of each pathway, relying on a broader
evidence base than theCTand IPV literaturewhere necessary, and analyze the degree
to which data from the review either supports or refutes the hypothesized pathway.
Economic Security and Emotional Well-Being Pathway
AsCTs are primarily designed as an economic social safety net, themost generalizable
pathway that results in decreases in IPV is through improved household economic
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security and associated decreases in household poverty (e.g., increased financial and
food security; increased savings, assets, and investments; and improved financial cop-
ing strategies). These improvements, in turn, have the potential to improve emotional
well-being of householdmembers by decreasing poverty-related stress and improving
mental health. This positive effect could directly lead to decreases in IPV, orwork indi-
rectly through decreased use of alcohol as a negative coping mechanism in response
to poverty and financial stress.
CTs and Increased Economic Security (Decreased Poverty)
There is a large and robust body of literature across different geographical regions
and program typologies showing that, in general, CTs have significant positive im-
pacts on a range of household-level economic-security outcomes, including poverty
rates, food security, household expenditure and consumption, household durable and
productive assets, income-generation and labor-force participation, and savings and
investments (Hidrobo et al. 2014; Bastagli et al. 2016; Natali et al. 2016; Banerjee
et al. 2017;Handa et al. 2017;Handa et al. 2018;Hidrobo et al. 2018). Further, there
is a growing body of literature documenting the positive local economy impacts of
CTs, implying positive spillovers on non-beneficiary households in terms of economic
outcomes (Taylor, Thome, and Filipski 2016). For this pathway to be effective, pro-
gram design and implementation components—such as the relative size of the trans-
fer, and the regularity andduration of benefits—are important factors in determining
the magnitude of the impact of CTs.
Economic Security and Improved Emotional Well-Being
There is increasing evidence that poverty and poormental health are linked in a two-
way, reinforcing relationship. On the one hand, poverty is a risk factor for poor men-
tal health and mental disorders though malnutrition, stress, substance abuse, social
exclusion, and exposure to trauma and violence (the social causation hypothesis),
while on the otherhand, poormental health increases risk of poverty due to increased
health expenditures, reduced productivity, stigma, and loss of employment and earn-
ings (the social drift hypothesis; Lund et al. 2010).
Whereas these linkages have beenwell explored in developed countries, only in the
last few decades has the relationship been confirmed in LMICs. Lund et al. (2010)
conducted a systematic review of the epidemiologic literature in LMICs to assess
the relationship between poverty and common mental disorders, and found that
among115 studies reviewed,most reported positive associations betweena variety of
povertymeasures and negativemental health outcomes (73 percent to 79 percent of
studies). However, the strength of this relationship depended on the specific poverty
dimensions examined. Corroborating these findings, a meta-analysis using 60 stud-
ies finds that individuals of low socio-economic status had higher odds of being
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depressed (Lorant et al. 2003), and a global analysis of over 139,000 individuals
from 131 countries shows a positive relationship between income and emotional
well-being, both within and across countries (Sacks, Stevenson, andWolferes 2010).
These findings are supported by qualitative evidence on the effects of transfers on
beneficiary families across regions. For example, a woman in Ecuador reported the
following:
“Inmyhousehold itwas like happiness,we all got along,withmy children,withmy
husband […] in my house we were happy […] because before we did not have enough
money for those things [food],” (Buller et al. 2016). Further, a Ugandan beneficiary
reports that “Apart from the cash, we have been united as a group. The project has
brought happiness in the family, as husbands and wives. It has also united parents to
their bigger children,” (Nuwakora 2014).
Haushofer and Fehr (2014) provide insights into the psychology of poverty by
summarizing evidence that suggests poverty-related stress causes negative affective
states (including sadness and anger), which increase short-sighted and risk-adverse
decision-making and other economic behaviors that reinforce poverty. Overall, evi-
dence confirms a strong relationship between poverty and mental health in develop-
ing settings.
Although the relationship between poverty and poor mental health is well estab-
lished,we know less about the typologies of interventions that are successful at break-
ing the two-way cycle. A recent review of programming concludes that, although
there is good evidence that a variety of mental health programs have positive impacts
on economic outcomes, overall the mental health effects of poverty-alleviation pro-
grams are inconclusive (Lund et al. 2011). However, CCTs are identified as a caveat
to the latter statement. In recent years there has also been increasing evidence that
UCTs have the potential to improve mental health and well-being of children, youth,
and adults in recipient households. In particular, there is evidence that CTs have pos-
itive impacts on measures of happiness and life satisfaction, stress, and depression
(Ozer et al. 2011; Daidone et al. 2015; Kilburn et al. 2016a; Haushofer and Shapiro
2016), as well as child cognitive and behavioral assessments, cortisol concentration
biomarkers, and adolescent psychological distress (Fernald and Gunnar 2009; Baird,
De Hoop, and Özler 2013; Kilburn et al. 2016b).
Emotional Well-Being and IPV
As with poverty and mental health, evidence suggests that the relationship between
poor mental health and IPV victimization is bidirectional (Machisa, Christofides, and
Jewkes 2017). In a recent systematic review and meta-analysis of longitudinal stud-
ies, Devries et al. (2013b) find that, for women and men, depressive symptoms were
associated with recent experience of IPV and, conversely, that recent experience
of IPV is associated with recent depressive symptoms (the latter for women only).
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Arecent study including10,178men in six countries inAsia and thePacific finds that
depressive symptoms increase the risk of physical, sexual, and emotional IPV perpe-
tration after adjusting for childhood exposure to violence (Fulu et al. 2013). Along-
side depression, the literature also identifies anxiety and post-traumatic stress dis-
order and other mental health disorders as associated with IPV victimization. For
example, a review of cross-sectional psychiatric morbidity and populations surveys
finds associations between all mental disorders and IPV victimization in both men
and women (Oram et al. 2014), and a systematic review and meta-analysis of 41
studies finds a higher risk of experiencing IPV among women with depressive dis-
orders, anxiety disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), in comparison
with women without mental health disorders (Trevillion et al. 2012).
The link between poor emotional well-being (in particular situational stress) and
IPVhas also been documented. Several studies, including one among couples inThai-
land, have demonstrated an association between current life stressors and the risk
of experiencing and/or perpetrating IPV (Hoffman, Demo, and Edwards 1994; Cano
and Vivian 2001). Additionally, a study among U.S. Air Force Active Duty members
documents a strong effect of financial stress on the risk of perpetrating IPV among
both men and women (Slep et al. 2010). There is also emerging evidence that child-
hood abuse or other adversities may potentiate the impact of recent stressors on risk
of IPV perpetration, a hypothesis known as the “stress sensitization theory.” Among
34,653 adults in the United States, for example, the risk of perpetrating IPV among
men with high current life stress was 10.1 percentage points greater among those
with histories of high versus low childhood adversity scores (Roberts et al. 2011).
Economic Security, Alcohol Abuse and IPV
A final mechanism through which improved economic security may affect the risk
of IPV is through reduced alcohol consumption via improved emotional well-being.
Although the relationship between economic security and alcohol use is complex,
many studies show that the largest burden of alcohol-related mortality and morbid-
ity falls on populations with low socio-economic status (Jones et al. 2015). Likewise,
a robust body of evidence from LMICs shows a strong and consistent association be-
tweenmen’s use of alcohol and women’s risk of IPV (Gage 2005; Foran and O’Leary
2008; Graham et al. 2008; Hindin, Kishor, and Ansara 2008; Dalal, Rahman, and
Jansson 2009; Abramsky et al. 2011); one systematic review pools the results of 11
studies and finds that harmful use of alcohol is associated with a 4.6-fold increased
risk of exposure to IPV compared with mild or no alcohol use (Gil-Gonzalez et al.
2006). Studies suggest that alcohol affects risk of IPV in multiple ways: as a trigger
for arguments (Heise 2012); by affecting problem-solving and other cognitive abili-
ties (Hoaken, Assaad, and Pihl 1998); by lowering inhibitions andmaking it easier to
misinterpret verbal and non-verbal cues (Klostermann and Fals-Stewart 2006); and
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by playing into culturally defined scripts about how alcohol affects behavior (Quigley
and Leonard 2006). While alcohol alone is neither necessary nor sufficient to cause
violence, a recent review concludes that it meets all the epidemiological criteria for
being considered a contributing cause of IPV (Leonard and Quigley 2017).
Intra-household Conflict Pathway
While greater financial stability may reduce IPV by improving emotional well-being,
access to cash can also affect violence directly by either reducing or increasing fodder
for arguments. More cash can reduce marital conflict over money, or it can increase
conflict if the money is diverted to temptation goods or partners disagree on how the
money is spent. In the systematic review, Vives-Cases, Gil-González, and Carrasco-
Portiño (2009) find thatmarital conflict is significantly associatedwith IPV in 10 out
of 11 studies identified.
Decreased Conflicts over Money
Conflicts over money have been identified by different studies in poverty contexts
as a trigger for violent episodes within couples (Rabbani, Qureshi, and Rizvi 2008;
Fehringer and Hindin 2014). Our review shows that CTs seem to have an impact in
reducing arguments of this type. From the papers included in our review, Buller et
al.’s (2016)mixed-methods analysis finds that the provision of cash to households re-
duces IPV, partially by eliminating theneed forwomen tonegotiate the daily cash they
need to buy food for the family. During qualitative interviews post-trial, women re-
ported that transfersmeant they did not have to ask their husbands formoney, which
eliminated a source of conflict in the relationship. Furthermore, Angeles (2012) finds
thatwomen inUganda reportedadecrease infights occurringdue to competitionover
scarce resources. TheCThelpedpay for anumber of items suchas school fees,medical
bills, or immediate needs, effectively reducing the arguments over money. Likewise,
Yildirim, Ozdemir, and Sezgin (2014) find that, according to respondents, a majority
of fights and continued IPV appeared to be due to financial difficulties, with the ma-
jority of victims reporting IPV decreases or cessation after they had started receiving
the transfer. According to a respondent in Turkey:
“There had beenmany fights. Because children neededmany things that we could
not have afforded. I asked my husband and he used to say there is no money. Then I
used to get upset and started to yell. We hadmany fights because of poverty. Not only
for us, for all poor, fights come from suffering,” (Yildirim, Ozdemir, and Sezgin 2014).
Increased Conflict over Temptation Goods
It is also possible that an unintended effect of CTs could be an increase in spending on
temptation goods by either men or women. This relationship has generally not been
supported by the literature, although there is limited global evidence on certain types
of temptation goods (e.g., gambling and prostitution as compared with consumable
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goods). Evans and Popova (2017) conducted a systematic review on the link between
CTs (both conditional and unconditional) in LMICs and temptation goods, primarily
alcohol and tobacco.Theauthors included50estimates from19studies andconclude
that there is no systematic evidence that beneficiaries increase spending on alcohol
and tobacco—a conclusion also reached by a recent analysis of seven government
UCT programs in Africa (Handa et al. 2017). It is important to note that this does not
mean that cash is not partially used to purchase these goods, but rather that there is
no systematic difference compared to spending in non-beneficiary households.
Women’s Empowerment Pathway
CTs are often hypothesized to empower women either through increasing their di-
rect access to cash, information (through trainings), or social networks (via group
activities)—all of which can enhance women’s sense of empowerment. If resources
are placed in the hands of a woman, her relative control of resources within the
household improves, thus increasing her bargaining power and ability to negotiate
her preferences. Direct receipt of cash also increases her financial autonomyand con-
tributes to enhanced self-efficacy and confidence, potentially shifting the balance of
power between the woman and her male partner.
Depending on how her partner reacts, this shift in power can either increase or
decrease a woman’s risk of IPV. Greater female empowerment can strengthen a
woman’s ability to exit an abusive relationship or at least credibly threaten to leave,
which might deter her husband from using violence. Likewise, if the man’s reaction
is positive and accepting, risk of violence may decrease as the man comes to appreci-
ate both his wife’s competency and the added resources she brings to the household.
Greater female empowerment, however, could result inmore violence if a man reacts
negatively tohiswife’swillingness to assert her preferencesmore forcefully. Somemen
may feel threatened by this shift in power andmay use violence to reassert their dom-
inance and male authority in the family.
CTs and Empowerment
Case studies support the notion that CTs can have transformational impacts on
women’s empowerment through improved decision-making and feelings of inde-
pendence from partners (Patel, Hochfield, and Jacqueline 2012; Nuwakora, 2014;
Yildirim, Ozdemir, and Sezgin 2014). As a woman from Northern Uganda reported:
“Earlier, we used to farm as a family. However, my husband would sometimes sell
household items without consulting me. But now that I have my own money, I can
have a say on how to spend income. Moreover, I cultivate the gardens together with
myhusband […]” (Nuwakora2014).Moreover, awoman inMexico states that “I have
seen that all mothers, like indigenous women that we are, things changed a lot. I no-
tice it because now women participate a lot, when there is an assembly, or meeting,
or “plática”. They participate a lot because they have this responsibility, in order for
the support [transfer] to come,” (Adato et al. 2000).
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Numerous studies also show that CTs increase women’s savings and income-
earning opportunities, suggesting that CTs may affect women’s bargaining power
(Perova, Reynolds, andMuller 2012; Green et al. 2015; Natali et al. 2016). However,
the broader evidence is mixed. In a recent synthesis of qualitative and quantitative
reviews and key evidence, van den Bold, Quisumbing, and Gillespie (2013) find that,
although qualitative evidence on CCTs largely from Latin America and the Caribbean
generally points to positive impacts on empowerment indicators, quantitative results
are mixed. More recent studies focusing on the Africa region come to the same broad
conclusions (Bonilla et al. 2017), and others raise competing arguments that CTs can
reinforce traditional gender norms, or place an additional burden on women’s time
use, further reinforcing gender inequities (Molyneux 2006; Chant 2008).
At least part of the ambiguity around this linkage can be attributed to the diverse
set of indicators used to measure empowerment and the inherent difficulty in draw-
ing conclusions based on few quantitative indicators of intra-household bargaining
(Peterman et al. 2015; Seymour and Peterman 2017). Adding to the complexities,
intra-household empowerment is highly contextual, and there has beenno clear con-
sensus within and across disciplines of how to best measure it (Malhotra and Schuler
2005). Thus, although there are promising case studies, there are alsomixed impacts,
and a lack of consolidated evidence across program typologies and diverse contexts
with differing gendered norms.
Shifts in Relationship Power and IPV
Another strand of literature reviews how empowerment and shifts in relationship
power may decrease or increase IPV (Perova, Reynolds, and Muller 2012; Hughes
et al. 2015). A woman’s risk of IPV based on the extent of her financial indepen-
dence and self-confidence is complex, context-specific, and contingent on factors such
as socio-cultural contexts of households, characteristics of households and individu-
als, and particularities of empowerment processes themselves (Hughes et al. 2015).
In terms of socio-cultural factors, in patriarchal contexts women’s empowerment is
more likely to lead to increased conflict and IPV, at least in the short term. Hence, the
relative status of women and men in terms of decision-making and how their power
and resources compare to eachother is an important contributing factor for increased
IPV (Hughes et al. 2015). This seems especially common in situations where a man
is unable to fulfill his gender-ascribed role as “bread-winner” and a woman is begin-
ning to contribute relatively more to family maintenance, or where a woman takes a
job that defies prevailing social convention (Hughes et al. 2015). This aligns with re-
searchbyMaldonado,Nájera, andSegovia (2005) fromMexico that shows that signif-
icant income increases to womenmay threatenmen’s status, causing husbandswith
more traditional gender views to reassert control through violence. Overall, how-
ever, the risk of increased IPV could also decline over time as both men’s individual
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attitudes and broader social attitudes become more accepting of women’s increased
economic activity and financial autonomy (Ahmed 2005). For example, some par-
ticipants in the South African IMAGE intervention reported that the increased self-
confidence, social support, and communication skills gained from being part of a
combined micro-finance and gender training initiative resulted in improved partner
communication, preventing any conflict escalating into violence (Kim et al. 2007).
Conclusion and Policy, Programmatic and Research Implications
Weconducted amixed-method review of the impact of CTs on IPV in LMICs and have
built a program theory to help understand the mechanisms behind this impact. In
total,we identified14quantitative andeight qualitative studies thatmet our inclusion
criteria, of which 11 and six, respectively, support the hypothesis that CTs decrease
IPV. We find little support for increases in IPV, and only two of our reviewed studies
had overall mixed or adverse impacts.
These findings, paired with the scale and relative cost-effectiveness of CTs, suggest
that they have the potential to decrease IPV at themargin across large populations of
vulnerable groups. However, across the 56 quantitative outcomesmeasured, approx-
imately 63 percent are insignificant, suggesting that CTs may have different impacts
on different types of violencewithin the same study. Transfers appear to reduce phys-
ical and/or sexual IPVmore consistently than emotional abuse or controlling behav-
iors. This finding is an apparent contradiction, since several of the pathways focus
on emotional states, which would suggest initial impacts on emotional and psycho-
logical IPV before affecting physical and sexual IPV. However, we conjecture that this
could be due in part tomeasurement issues, as emotional IPV ismeasured less in stud-
ies, and with greater variability. Further, definitions of emotionally abusive acts vary
across cultures and are thus more difficult to define (Garcia Moreno et al. 2004).
As CTs are primarily a policy tool to respond to poverty and vulnerability, it is un-
likely that large-scale institutional programming will be designed with the specific
objective of decreasing IPV. However, if small design changes have the potential to
decrease IPV—a key indicator of well-being and gender equity—transfer programs
have the scope to realize significant gains across sectors, at a lower cost than violence-
specific programming. Research to better understand how CTs affect IPV, and under
what conditions, can help policy-makersmaximize these gains whileminimizing any
unintended negative impacts of CT programs. As the collection of IPV measures in
multi-topic surveys are likely to imply significant survey logistical costs, expanding
the feasibility of experimental “light touch” methods are likely to aid understanding
of the dynamics in generalized programming (Peterman et al. 2017a).
We found evidence to support all three hypothesized pathways: economic security
and emotional well-being; intra-household conflict; andwomen’s empowerment.We
also found substantial evidence from related literature to support each step in the
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proposed causal chains, with the exception of increasing violence by exacerbating
conflict over the consumption of temptation goods. According to our program theory,
the economic security and emotional well-being pathway is the only one that exclu-
sively reduces IPV; the other two pathways may increase or decrease IPV, depending
on whether additional cash aggravates or soothes relationship conflict and/or how
men respond to women’s increased empowerment. How these pathways play out
depends on intra-household gender dynamics, which are, in turn, affected by local
gender regimes and socio-economic inequalities within a setting or beneficiary pop-
ulation. Thus far, quantitative evaluations have not been well designed to measure
these mechanisms, particularly those relating to relationship dynamics and behav-
ioral intra-household measures.
The qualitative studies suggest that in highly patriarchal settings, shifts in house-
hold dynamics that are less challenging to traditional gender norms are less likely
to prompt violence. Likewise, programs that generate smaller shifts in relationship
power appear more easily accepted by men than those catalyzing larger disrup-
tions (Maldonado, Nájera, and Segovia 2005; Slater and Mphale 2008). For exam-
ple, Buller et al. (2016) note that increased cash and in-kind transfers to women
have been accepted by Colombian and Ecuadorian men in part because they are in-
tended for children’s nutrition, a domain already within the domestic responsibilities
of women. Indeed, how a program is “framed” and the meaning imbued to cash by
a program’s stated intent (e.g., for women’s entrepreneurship versus child health)
may influence the transfer’s impact on gender dynamics and IPV as much as any
other program feature. More “acceptable” shifts might also be achieved by making
smaller, more regular transfers (conducive to small household purchases managed
by women), rather than larger or lump-sum transfers. It should be noted, however,
that the Kenya Give Directly study tested lump-sum versus periodic transfers and
finds that the difference did not significantly affect the magnitude or impacts on IPV
(Haushofer and Shapiro 2016). Understanding the importance of transfer size and
other design features on intra-household dynamics is important, as economic secu-
rity and poverty impacts are likely to be larger with increasing size of the transfer rel-
ative to pre-program household consumption, thus suggesting a potential program
design trade-off.
The recipient of the CT is also likely to be a key factor in understanding poten-
tial impacts on IPV. While empirical evidence is scarce and mixed in terms of the im-
pact of recipient sex on economic and human capital outcomes of transfers, there is
even less evidence for how different targeting schemes affect IPV outcomes (Yoong,
Rabinovich, and Diepeveen 2012). Across the studies reviewed here, the majority of
CTs transfer cash to women; therefore, a large gap in knowledge remains with re-
spect to impacts on IPVwhenmen are the main recipient, as is the case in many pro-
grams in Africa. Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) published the only study that ran-
domly compares male and female beneficiaries, and the authors find no differential
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impact on IPV. These differenceswill be particularly important in settingswheremen
are the de facto recipient due to gendered mobility constraints and lower perceived
cultural acceptability of transferring benefits to women (e.g., Middle East and parts
of South Asia).
Lastly, the associated benefits from complementary activities such as trainings and
group meetings are also likely to be a key factor that shapes how a CT program im-
pacts IPV. Complementary activities could independently decrease IPV by empower-
ingwomen through increased knowledge,which leads to increased self-esteem, social
interaction, and social capital.Most CTprograms reviewedare linked to somecomple-
mentary activities. While the literature acknowledges that complementary activities
might play a role in generating impacts, this mechanism is seldom explored explicitly.
The Bangladesh study by Roy et al. (2017) is the only one that attempts to separately
evaluate the impact of the transfer versus the transfer-plus-auxiliary activities. These
authors find that decreases in IPV sixmonths post-program exist only in the CT-plus-
BCC group, and not in the CT-only group.
It is worth mentioning that although average impacts of the studies reviewed
overwhelmingly show decreases in IPV, several studies find increases for select IPV
outcomes within particular sub-groups of beneficiaries (e.g., Bobonis et al. 2013;
Hidrobo and Fernald 2013). In addition, we excluded two studies where the cash
transfers are one-time lump-sum grants as part of larger micro-enterprise programs
with couples therapy or bundled livelihood, savings, and coaching programs. In the
first study, Green et al. (2015) find that women in Northern Uganda receiving the
micro-enterprise training alone have experienced increased marital control, while
those with added couples therapy have not (with no impacts among either group on
physical or emotional abuse). In the second study, Ismayilova et al. (2017) find that
women in Burkina Faso benefiting fromboth arms of bundled savings and livelihoods
programming have experienced reduced emotional violence; however, this effect is
larger amongst those women receiving family coaching. Therefore, while our assess-
ment is optimistic about the direction and level of impacts on IPV, we recognize that
diverse programming variations are yet to be widely tested and understood.
Our review has a number of limitations. We exclude studies that explore the im-
pact of transfers on other types of violence that may have implications for IPV,
including community-level violence or intra-household violence perpetrated or di-
rected at other household members. For example, there is increasing interest and
some potential for social safety nets, including CTs, to decrease violence against chil-
dren, although the evidence is weak for most types of childhood violence apart from
sexual violence and abuse among adolescent girls (Peterman et al. 2017b). Conclu-
sions around promising mechanisms for reduction of violence against children re-
late to several of those that we identify, including increases in economic security
and decreases in poverty-related stress. This suggests the potential for CTs to affect
multiple types of intra-household violence simultaneously, but no study to date has
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explored this potential. Likewise, transfers could decrease community violence
through positive economic spillovers into non-beneficiary households, or could in-
crease violence due to social tensions and jealousy triggered by the CT (Adato 2000;
Slater and Mphale 2008; Wasilkowska 2012; Beasley, Morris, and Vitali 2016). Fi-
nally, we cannot generalize our findings on household dynamics to high-income
countries or from CTs to broader social protection or economic strengthening pro-
grams.
Our findings, however, have important implications for future research. First, eval-
uations should carefully consider the IPV metrics to be included to ensure that they
capture internationally validated measures of IPV that are sensitive to program im-
pact (Heise and Hossain 2017). To date, we know little about how CTs may affect the
frequency and severity of IPV, which would aid our understanding of dynamics at
the margin. Second, studies need to go beyond impact to include validated and credi-
ble measurement of pathways to better understand the behavioral underpinnings of
the CT and IPV relationship. In doing so, studies will deepen both our understanding
of how transfers affect IPV, and our understanding of the behavioral relationships
beneath each causal link, many of which are understudied in LMICs. It is likely that
mixed-method studies will advance our understanding of these links better than ei-
ther quantitative or qualitative studies alone; however, to date, few mixed-methods
evaluations have been conducted.
There is also a need for a better understanding of how program design features
affect ultimate outcomes and pathways, particularly with respect to targeting, com-
plementary programming, program linkages, and conditionalities. Of the quantita-
tive studies included in the review, only four use a research design that is able to test
program variations (Green et al. 2015; Haushofer and Shapiro 2016; Hidrobo et al.
2016; Roy et al. 2017), and none were able to test potential synergistic effects be-
tween program components.
There are large regional and contextual gaps in our understanding of dynamics,
with evidence skewed to Latin America and little understanding of Asia and theMid-
dle East, or of how dynamicsmay differ in humanitarian settings. Evidence from SSA
is scarce (particularly empirical evidence) and is concentrated in Eastern and South-
ernAfrica,with little evidence arising fromWestern andCentralAfrica,where gender
norms and institutionsmay vary. Finally, we know little about long-term impacts, in-
cluding how impacts may vary over time horizons and if impacts are non-linear, as
well as the sustainability of impacts after CTs end or households graduate (the latter
was studied only by Roy et al. 2017).
Although our review indicates that CTs are promising tools to reduce IPV, this re-
lationship is complex and there are large gaps in our understanding of what program
design components are necessary or beneficial in diverse settings. For example, it is
likely that within any one program there are multiple or competing casual pathways
in operation, with differential distributional impacts or those that vary by type of IPV.
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It is also possible that impacts in the short run may differ from longer-term impacts
as relationships begin and end and programs are phased out. Although we have not
conducted a meta-analysis due to variation in outcomes captured, as the evidence
base grows, futureworkmay be able to capture variation inmagnitude of impact and
how it relates to key program design features, including transfer size and important
contextual factors such as baseline prevalence of IPV. As cash and other transfers are
increasingly scaled up in development settings,wewelcome further research to better
understand and leverage gains across sectors on non-traditional outcomes including
IPV.
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1. The COREQ checklist is a 32-item list for interviews and focus group discussions to assess the
quality of the qualitative studies that have been included in this review (Tong, Sainsbury, and Craig
2007).
2. The justification for this decision is primarily because studies vary to the extent that they conduct
additional analysis,whichwould potentially skew results towards specific studies. In addition, the choice
of which sub-sample analysis is explored is left to authors; thus, we may not capture an unbiased pic-
ture of potential heterogeneous effects when comparing results side by side. Finally, the methodology to
analyze sub-samples varies by study. It should be noted that no study was explicitly set up (sampled) to
conduct heterogeneity analysis.
3. We count Pettifor et al. (2016) and Kilburn et al. (2018) in South Africa as one study, as the
latter extends the former to examine pathways and additional indicators but fundamentally exam-
ines the same sample using the same methodology. In contrast, while other papers examine the same
program (Oportunidades, Juntos), they have utilized different samples, rounds of data or use different
methodology—thus, we count them as separate studies.
4. Note that these counts by violence typology sum to greater than 56, as certain classifications
count in several categories for combined indicators.
34 TheWorld Bank Research Observer, vol. 0, no. 0 ( 2018)
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/w
bro/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/w
bro/lky002/5091868 by London School of H
ygiene & Tropical M
edicine user on 08 Septem
ber 2018
5. Some of the studies use mixed methods, but the quantitative sections do not meet the inclusion
criteria for the quantitative part of this review. We have only analyzed the qualitative data and, to the
extent possible, have presented results from the qualitative sections.
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